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Abstract
Background: Individual-based models can provide the most reliable estimates of the spread of infectious diseases. In the
present study, we evaluated the diffusion of pandemic influenza in Italy and the impact of various control measures,
coupling a global SEIR model for importation of cases with an individual based model (IBM) describing the Italian epidemic.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We co-located the Italian population (57 million inhabitants) to households, schools and
workplaces and we assigned travel destinations to match the 2001 census data. We considered different R0 values (1.4; 1.7;
2), evaluating the impact of control measures (vaccination, antiviral prophylaxis -AVP-, international air travel restrictions
and increased social distancing). The administration of two vaccine doses was considered, assuming that first dose would be
administered 1-6 months after the first world case, and different values for vaccine effectiveness (VE). With no interventions,
importation would occur 37–77 days after the first world case. Air travel restrictions would delay the importation of the
pandemic by 7–37 days. With an R0 of 1.4 or 1.7, the use of combined measures would reduce clinical attack rates (AR) from
21–31% to 0.3–4%. Assuming an R0 of 2, the AR would decrease from 38% to 8%, yet only if vaccination were started within
2 months of the first world case, in combination with a 90% reduction in international air traffic, closure of schools/
workplaces for 4 weeks and AVP of household and school/work close contacts of clinical cases. Varying VE would not
substantially affect the results.
Conclusions: This IBM, which is based on country-specific demographic data, could be suitable for the real-time evaluation
of measures to be undertaken in the event of the emergence of a new pandemic influenza virus. All preventive measures
considered should be implemented to mitigate the pandemic.
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Introduction
The emergence of the highly virulent A/H5N1 avian influenza
strain [1], which is capable of infecting humans [2] and could
acquire the capacity for efficient person-to-person transmission,
has given rise to concerns over the risk of a future influenza
pandemic [3]. In fact, this virus, or a closely related one, is
considered to be the leading contender as the source of the next
human influenza pandemic [4–6]. For these reasons, countries
have been urged to strengthen their preparedness plans [6], and
several countries have considered stockpiling both antiviral drugs
and monovalent influenza vaccines containing potentially pan-
demic strains, such as A/H5N1 (i.e., a pre-pandemic vaccine), for
population priming [7].
However, some control measures can be costly (e.g., stockpiling
antiviral drugs, vaccines, and a pre-pandemic vaccine), and others
could have limited social acceptance (e.g., closure of schools/
workplaces and travel restrictions). For these reasons, several
countries have used mathematical models to predict the spread of
infection at the national level, which is an important aspect of
preparedness, and to evaluate the feasibility of containing the
pandemic using different strategies [8–14].
Individual-based models can provide the most reliable estimates
of the spread of influenza [8–11]. In the present study, we
evaluated the diffusion of pandemic influenza in Italy and the
impact of various control measures, coupling a global SEIR model
with an individual based model. We used actual demographic
data, obtained from the 2001 census, which allowed us to simulate
the spread of an influenza pandemic and the impact of control
measures. In particular, we examined the impact of antiviral
prophylaxis of close contacts, social distancing measures, interna-
tional air travel restrictions, and vaccination (both pandemic and
pre-pandemic vaccine), under different R0 values. Since it has
been shown that seasonal influenza vaccine effectiveness is higher
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assumed that both pandemic and pre-pandemic vaccine effective-
ness would vary by age.
Methods
The worldwide spread of pandemic influenza and the
consequent importation of cases in Italy were modelled using a
global deterministic SEIR (susceptible–exposed, but not yet
infectious-infectious–recovered, and no longer susceptible) model
(herein referred to as the ‘‘global SEIR model’’) [14]. The national
impact of an influenza pandemic in Italy and of various control
measures was predicted using a stochastic individual-based SEIR
model (IBM) [8–11].
In both models, we assumed that the latency period for
influenza was the same as the incubation period: duration of 1.5
(60.5 SD) days. In the IBM, we assumed that the duration of
infectiousness varied over time, as a lognormal function [8,9].
Infectiousness peaked at 1.75 days, and its duration was truncated
at 10 days [8,9]. This corresponded to an average generation time
of 2.6 days. In the global SEIR model, the infectious period was
assumed to be constant over time and was set at 1.5 days [13,18],
to give the same growth rate as the IBM [9] (See Text S1).
In both the SEIR and IBM models, we considered different
transmission rates to obtain R0 values of 1.4, 1.7, and 2, which in
the IBM corresponded to cumulative clinical attack rates (AR) of
21.2%, 30.8%, and 38.7%, respectively, indicating a mild,
moderate and severe scenario [19]. The results were obtained by
averaging 50 simulations for each scenario.
Global SEIR model
In this model, we assumed that infectious individuals were all
symptomatic and no longer travelling and that exposed individuals
were asymptomatic and possibly travelling before the infectious
phase. We coupled the results of the global SEIR model with 2003
data on arrivals and departures in Italy’s 38 international airports
[20]. Specifically, the number of imported exposed individuals was
expressed as
E(t)
N
a, where E(t) is the number of exposed
individuals obtained with the global SEIR model at time t, N is the
world population, and a is the total number of persons arriving
daily in Italy (an average of 70,000). The probability of importing
infections to municipalities with international airports is given by
pi~
ai
a
, where ai is the number of persons arriving daily in the i-th
airport (ranging from 0.1 to 22,000 on average) (see Text S1).
National data on in-coming flow by land and sea were not easily
available, and were therefore not included in the model.
IBM
Socio-demographic structure. Data on Italy’s population
were obtained from the 2001 census, which includes information
on age structure, household size, household composition (e.g.,
single individuals or couples with or without children), school
attendance, employment categories, municipality of residence, and
data on the population that commutes daily within national
borders (see Text S1) [21]. The 2001 census was performed by
collecting data through direct interviews with individuals with
official declared residence in a given municipality and those
actually living in that municipality.
In the model, which can be viewed as a patchmodel with multiple
levels of mixing, Italy’s 56,995,744 inhabitants were hierarchically
grouped by municipality (n=8,101), province (n=103) and region
(n=20) (Figure S1). The mean radius of Italian municipalities,
provinces and regions is, respectively, 3.02 km (SD=1.64 km),
13.01 km (SD=3.56 km), and 67.01 km (SD=18.32 km).
Individuals were randomly placed in households to match the
2001 census data on age structure and on household size and
composition ( Figure S2). Nine different types of households were
considered (e.g., singles or couples, with or without children, with
or without additional additional members, adults living together)
and individuals were co-located in households according to specific
data on the percentage of the different household types, their size,
the age of the household head (see Text S1, Tables S1, S2, S3, S4,
S5, Figure S3).
Children and adolescents aged 0–18 years were assigned to one
of six levels of school (i.e., from day care to university) (Table 1)
(see Text S1).
In individuals aged $15 years, the average employment rate
was 43%, ranging from 1.5% for 15 year-olds to 73% for
individuals aged 36 years [22]. Each working individual was
randomly assigned to one of seven employment categories, defined
by the number of employees in the workplace (1–5, 6–9, 10–19,
20–49, 50–99, 100–249, and $250) [21] (see Text S1, Figure S2).
In the model, schools and workplaces were located at the centroid
of each municipality.
We modelled travel destinations using data on commuting,
which were available from the 2001 census for persons $15 years
of age [21]. The census includes individual data on daily
commutes to school or work, specifiying whether the commute is
within the same municipality of residence, outside the municipality
but within the same province, outside the province but within the
same region, or outside of the region. We used these data to
develop a gravity model [22], in which the probability of
commuting from one municipality to another increases with the
population sizes and decreases with the distance. Moreover, the
employed gravity model accounts for the spatial variability in
the proportion of commuters (see Text S1, Figures S4 and S5).
Schools and workplaces were generated using previously
reported methods [8]. Briefly, we used national statistics on the
average size of schools and workplaces [23] to generate a synthetic
population of schools and workplaces distributed in space with a
density proportional to the local population density. These
methods allocate students (including those ,15 years of age) to
schools and workers to workplaces using census data (see Text S1).
Moreover, students and workers were clustered to form groups
of persons in close contact (i.e., classes for schools and groups of
colleagues for workplaces). For schools, the average number of
persons in a class, by school category (e.g., daycare, nursery school,
Table 1. School/workplace attendance and contact patterns
School
category
Age group
in years
% attending
population
Average
number
of close
contacts
% of clinical
cases staying
at home
Day care 0–2 14 20 90
Nursery school/
Kindergarten
3–5 90 40 90
Primary school 6–10 97 19 80
Middle school 11–13 96 21 80
High school 14–18 82 21 75
University 19–24 31 34 50
Workplace $15 43 5 50
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.t001
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(Table 1) [23].
Transmission model. Infection can be transmitted within
households and schools/workplaces and among random contacts.
For a given individual, the probability of being infected is 12e
2lT,
where l is the sum of the force of infections coming from the three
above-mentioned sources and T is the time-step of the simulation,
which is fixed at 0.25 days.
Whereas we assumed homogeneous mixing in households,
schools and workplaces, all susceptible individuals are considered
as random contacts of an infectious individual, and the probability
of being infected is weighted by a kernel function which is a
decreasing function of the distance [8,9]. The parameters of the
kernel were optimized on the basis of the distance to work/school
distribution as resulting by the application of the gravity model
employed for assigning travel destinations (see Text S1).
In the three scenarios considered (R0 values of 1.4, 1.7, and 2)
[19], different values of the transmission rates were determined for
the different transmission sources (households, schools/workplaces
and random contacts) (see Text S1).
The basic reproductive number (R0) of the simulated epidemics
was estimated according to a previously published model [8] (See
Text S1, Figure S6). We also assumed that 50% of infections result
in clinical illness and that the transmission rate does not differ
between symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals [9].
All the simulations were run until the incidence was zero.
Control measures. We considered the following control
measures: a) vaccination; b) antiviral prophylaxis (AVP), c) social
distancing, and d) air travel restrictions.
Vaccination. The target population was divided into 4 categories:
i) personnel providing essential services (15% of the 25–60-year-
old working population) [21]; ii) elderly persons ($65 years of
age); iii) children and adolescents from 2 to 18 years of age; and iv)
adults from 40 to 64 years of age. Vaccination was modelled by
reducing the proportion of susceptible individuals in the target
population. This proportion depends on vaccination coverage
(VC) and vaccine effectiveness (VE). We assumed that vaccination
consists of two vaccine doses administered one month apart and
that VC was 60% of the target population. This VC was chosen on
the basis of the 2005–2006 seasonal influenza coverage, which was
68% in elderly persons (.64 years) [24]. We assumed that one
week is necessary for administering each vaccine dose to all target
categories. Vaccination was considered to be effective beginning
15 days after the administration of the second dose. Three
different assumptions on VE were considered: i) VE of 70%, for all
age-groups; ii) VE of 50%, for all age-groups; and iii) VE of 59%
for individuals aged 2–18 years [16], 70% for individuals aged 40–
64 years [15], and 40% for individuals aged $65 years [17]. We
assumed that individuals are vaccinated irrespective of whether or
not they were infectious or ill.
When considering the impact of single interventions, we
assumed that vaccination begins 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 months after
the first world case, targeting three of the target categories (i.e.,
personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, and 2–18
year-olds), and assuming a VE of 70% for all three categories.
When considering multiple interventions, we assumed that
vaccination begins at 2, 3 or 4 months after the first world case,
and we considered the different assumptions for VE reported
above (70% for all, 50% for all, or varying by age).
Given that an estimated 3–6 months would be required to
produce pandemic influenza vaccines, the administration of a first
dose within 3 months of the first world case would be possible only
if this dose contained a precursor of the pandemic strain [4],
followed by a dose of pandemic vaccine. The actual VE of this
regimen was assumed to be equal to that of two doses of the
pandemic vaccine.
Antiviral. We took into consideration the administration of one
course of antiviral drugs, providing therapy for the index case and
prophylaxis for close contacts. Both therapy and prophylaxis were
assumed to start one day after clinical onset in the index case. The
treatment of the index case was assumed to reduce infectiousness
by 70% [8–11], whereas AVP was assumed to reduce susceptibility
to infection by 30%, infectiousness by 70%, and the occurrence of
symptomatic disease by 60% [10].
We assumed that AVP be provided to 90% of the close contacts
of clinical cases (50% of all infected individuals), with a treatment
course of 10 days [25]. Two different definitions of close contacts
were used: i) household contacts only; and ii) household contacts
plus close contacts in the school or workplace (Table 1). We
considered administering AVP for the entire epidemic period;
however, since the feasibility of actually doing this would be
limited, we also considered adminstering AVP as a policy to be
used only for the first 8 weeks after the occurrence of the first
Italian case.
Social distancing. We considered the nationwide closing of all
schools and some public offices not providing essential services,
corresponding to 20% of all employees in these types of offices
[26]. We assumed that school and office closings begin 4 weeks
after the onset of the first 20 symptomatic cases in Italy and that
this measure be maintained for 4 weeks.
We also assumed that symptomatic individuals spontaneously
limit their school/work attendance. The proportion of symptom-
atic individuals staying at home from school/workplace would
vary by age, from 90% among children ,6 years of age to 50%
among the working population (Table 1).
d) Air travel restrictions. We considered travel restrictions that
would reduce incoming international flights by 90% or 99%,
starting from day 30 of the first world case [9] and lasting for the
entire duration of the epidemic, or until two months after the
introduction of the first case in Italy. The reduction of domestic air
travel and the control of land and sea borders were not considered
in the model.
Results
Baseline dynamics
For different R0 scenarios, the results of the global SEIR model
showed that the number of imported symptomatic cases would be
53,000, 72,000, and 83,000 (See Text S1, Figure S7), with the first
Italian case appearing, respectively, after 77, 48 and 37 days
(Figure S8); the epidemic curves for these scenarios are shown in
Figure 1.
For R0=1.7, the spatial spread of the epidemic showed that for
the first 10 days the new cases would be confined to the
municipalities where cases were first imported (Figure 2). At 11–
20 days, new cases would begin to occur far from these
municipalities, mainly in municipalities with a large population.
At 21–40 days (the exponential growth phase), infection would
spread simultaneously to nearly the entire country, with no clear
spatial pattern.
The epidemic peak is reached after 202, 125 and 91 days,
respectively, for the three different scenarios (Figure 1). The
pandemic season at the national level would last for a period of 3
to 6 months, with an average of 67,000–243,000 clinical cases per
day. The cumulative infected AR would be 42.4%, 61.6% and
77.4%, for the three scenarios, corresponding to a clinical AR of
21.2%, 30.8%, and 38.7%. The clinical daily-peak AR would be
Pandemic Influenza in Italy
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considered below.
The comparisons of baseline scenarios with historical data are
described in the Text S1 (Figures S9 and S10).
Impact of control measures
Single measures. The results of the single control measures
for different scenarios are reported in Tables 2–3. International air
travel restriction would not affect the AR (Table 2) but could delay
the importation of cases, increasing the time elapsed from the first
world case to importation from a minimum of 7 days to a
maximum of 37 days, depending on the R0 and the level of
restriction (Table 3, Figure S8). The pandemic peak would also be
delayed by 6–39 days (Table 2; Figure 3). Nationwide closure of
schools and workplaces not providing essential services would
delay the time of occurrence of the peak by 5–8 days, depending
from the scenario considered.
AVP appears to be the most effective single intervention,
resulting in a 36%–76% reduction in cumulative ARs. It also
contributes to delay the peak day (from 13 to 53 days) and to
decrease the peak daily attack rate.
Vaccination impact strongly depends from its timing. In the
mild scenario, it would reduce the cumulative AR by approxi-
mately 65%, if it is begun within 4 months of the first world case
(Table 2). In the moderate and severe scenarios, ARs would be
reduced by 42% and 31% respectively, if vaccination starts within
2 months and one month from the pandemic start (Table 2).
Combined measures. Table 4 shows the impact of
combining vaccination with international air travel restrictions.
In the mild scenario, there is no clear added value of air travel
restriction. In the moderate and severe scenarios, the
implementation of 99% of air travel restriction would allow to
have one additional month to implement vaccination, since
administering first dose within three months instead of two, for
the moderate scenario, and within two months instead of one, for
the severe scenario, would not modify cumulative Ars
When combing all of the measures, in the mild scenario, the
epidemic could be mitigated with moderate efforts. Specifically,
performing vaccination for three target categories (i.e., personnel
providing essential services, elderly persons, and 2–18 year-olds)
and providing AVP to 90% of household contacts for the entire
epidemic period would reduce the cumulative AR by 98% (from
21% to 0.3%), independently of the timing of vaccination (2, 3 or
4 months) and the implementation of air-travel restrictions.
Limiting AVP to 8 weeks would produce a cumulative AR of
7.7%, which is similar to that observed with vaccination alone.
Figure 1. Baseline simulations under different R0 scenarios
(blue line: R0=2; red line: R0=1.7; green line: R0=1.4). Bullet
points represent the first Italian case and the time elapsed from the first
world case.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.g001
Figure 2. Spatial spread of pandemic influenza in Italy, R0=1.7. Red areas represent municipalities where at least one case is present.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.g002
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 3 | e1790For the moderate scenario (Table 5, Figure 3), vaccinating the
three above-mentioneded target categories and providing AVP to
90% of household contacts for the entire epidemic period, with
90% air travel restriction would reduce the cumulative AR by
77%–87% (from 31% to 4–7%, depending on the timing of the
first vaccine dose). The cumulative AR is reduced by 87%, if 99%
air-travel restrictions were implemented, and vaccination were
begun within 4 months of pandemic start.
If air-travel restrictions were not implemented or were limited to
the first two-months after the first national case, the AR decrease
would be similar (81–87%), providing that vaccination were started
within 3 months of the first world case. The cumulative AR would be
even lower (2%, for first dose at 3 months) if AVP were provided to
both household contacts and close contacts in schools and workplaces.
This would require the administration of 11 millions of AV courses.
For the severe scenario (Table 6, Figure 3), the cumulative AR
would decrease by 64% (from 39% to 14%) if the first vaccine dose
were administered within 2 months of the first world case, AVP
were provided to household contacts for the entire epidemic
period, and 90% air-travel restriction were implemented,
independently from its duration. The cumulative AR would
further decrease (to 9%) if also vaccinating 40–64-year-old
individuals, which would reduce the number of household contacts
receiving AVP by 33%. If not vaccinating 40–64-year-olds and
providing AVP to both household contacts and close contacts in
schools and workplaces, the cumulative AR would decrease to 8%,
though this would require an extremely high number of AVP
doses (approximately 32 millions). Finally, with the implementa-
tion of 99% air-travel restriction, starting vaccination within three
months of pandemic emergence would have the same impact than
starting vaccination within two months, with no air-travel
restrictions in place (cumulative AR=16%). None of the other
combinations of control measures would reduce the cumulative
clinical AR to less than 16%.
Assuming a VE of 50% for all age-groups or a different VE by
age group (i.e., 59% in individuals aged 2–18 years, 70% in
individuals aged 40–64 years, and 40% in individuals $65 years)
would not substantially affect the cumulative AR; in fact, the
cumulative AR would be 2 or 3 percentage points higher,
respectively, than observed assuming a 70% VE for all age groups
(Tables 5 and 6).
Figure 4 shows the cumulative AR by age and vaccination
strategy. If no control measures were performed (baseline), the
cumulative AR would be highest for individuals #18 years of age
and would decrease with increasing age. None of the considered
scenarios included vaccinating 18–25-year-old individuals, who
consequently appear to be the age-group with the highest
incidence after vaccination. However, if vaccinating personnel
providing essential services (15% of the 25–60-year-old working
population), elderly persons ($65-year-olds), and 2–18 year-olds,
the AR would also decrease among individuals 19–64 years of age,
Table 3. Interval (in days) from the first world case to the
importation of the first case in Italy, by scenario and level of
international air travel restriction.
Time elapsed from first world case to
importation in Italy (in days) (95% CI)
Scenario
Level of air travel
restriction
Mild Moderate Severe
None 77 (55,92) 48 (34,57) 37 (25,42)
90% 94 (72,108) 59 (44,69) 44 (34,51)
99% 114 (92,127) 71 (55,79) 53 (42,60)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.t003
Figure 3. Clinical AR, by control measure and scenario (Panel A: R0=1.7; Panel B: R0=2). black=baseline results; light blue= 90% air
travel restriction; violet=AVP to household contacts; blue=vaccination, administering first dose within 3 months of the first world case for R0=1.7,
or within 2 months for R0=2; grey=90% air travel restriction+vaccination, as reported for the blue line; green=all control measures combined;
red=all control measures combined, extending AVP to school/work close contacts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.g003
Pandemic Influenza in Italy
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 3 | e1790who are not targeted by vaccination. In particular, the AR would
decrease by approximately 75% in unvaccinated 30–50-year-old
individuals. Excluding the elderly from vaccination would not
affect the cumulative AR in the other age groups.
Conclusions
Recent modelling studies have estimated that the first cases of
influenza in a future pandemic would be imported to Europe
within 50–90 days of its emergence elsewhere in the world [9,18].
Our results indicate that the first cases would be imported to Italy
within 37–77 days, depending on the R0, and that the incidence
would peak 54–125 days after importation. When considering
separately the three scenarios in our study, the timing of the peak
for the severe scenario (i.e., 54 days) was similar to that for the
severe scenario in the UK (i.e., 50 days), whereas it differed for the
moderate scenario (i.e., 77 days for Italy compared to 65 days for
the UK) [9]. The reason for this divergence is likely due to the
different R0 values considered in the global SEIR model, which
were scaled in order to be proportional to those considered in the
national IBM simulations (i.e., 1.4, 1.7, and 2). Varying the global
R0, can in fact substantially modify the timing of national first case
introduction, and the consequent epidemic peak. The lower
number of air travellers coming into Italy per year compared to
US and UK (25 millions, versus 73 and 92 millions, respectively)
[9], could also play a role in explaining this difference.
It is widely accepted that a combination of measures would be
necessary to sufficiently control the spread of an influenza
pandemic, specifically, vaccination, AVP, social distancing, and
air travel restrictions [9–11]. In our simulations, AVP is confirmed
to be the most effective single intervention [11]; however this
would require to stockpile a high number of antivirals, to be
capable to rapidly identify index cases, to treat a high number of
contacts, and to maintain their compliance to a treatment lasting
10 days.
Recent modelling studies have predicted that the use of a pre-
pandemic vaccine with a low VE after the first dose (i.e., 30%)
would be crucial for pandemic mitigation if the R0 were 1.7 yet
not higher [10]. In our model, we introduced pre-pandemic
vaccine for population priming and considered the vaccine to be
effective only after the administration of a successive dose of
pandemic vaccine, assuming different hypotheses for VE. In
particular, we were interested in determining whether variations in
VE by age could provide further insight into the impact of control
measures. Systematic reviews have shown that the clinical
effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccine varies with age, with a
higher VE in adults than in children and the elderly (70% vs. 59%
and 40%, respectively) [15,17,27]. Our results show that these
differences would not substantially affect the cumulative AR.
Moreover, vaccinating 2–18 year-olds would reduce by approx-
imately 75% the AR in unvaccinated 30–50-year-old adults,
showing a clear herd immunity effect. These results thus support
the idea that, during a pandemic, vaccinating children should be a
higher priority than vaccinating elderly persons [11,28].
With specific regard to air-travel restrictions, the effectiveness of
this measure remains controversial [9,13,14,29–33]. Our results
confirm that international air-travel restrictions can buy about 1 to
3 weeks in delaying the epidemic [9,14,32,33]. In the moderate and
severe scenarios, the implementation of 99% air-travel restriction,
would allow to gather one-two months of time for administering the
vaccine to target population. In detail, if R0 were 2, starting
vaccination within three months of pandemic emergence would
have the same impact than starting vaccination within two months
of the first world case, with no air-travel restrictions in place.
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 3 | e1790However, the administration of the first vaccine dose within
three months of the first world case would be possible only if
vaccines against ‘‘high pandemic risk’’ avian influenza strains (such
as A/H5N1) were stockpiled before the pandemic. In any case,
because of the antigenic drift of the virus, it is not possible to
precisely predict the effectiveness of pre-pandemic vaccines. In this
scenario, it is reassuring that a decrease in VE from 70% to 50%
would not significantly modify the impact of vaccination.
When using a pre-pandemic vaccine, the maximum reduction
in the AR would be achieved by either providing AVP to both
household contacts and close contacts in the school/workplace, as
shown in a previous work [11] (i.e., 32 million antiviral courses,
covering approximately 56% of the national population), or by
vaccinating adults (i.e., 25 million vaccine courses), in addition to
the other target categories. In the occurrence of an actual
pandemic, the choice of the strategy will be based on several
factors which at present are unknown, such as the capacity to
produce vaccines, the effectiveness of vaccination and AVP, and
logistic constraints in the distribution of vaccines and AVP.
In interpreting the results of this model, some limitations need to
be mentioned. The model requires detailed information on the
population’s characteristics, including age and geographic distri-
bution, the size of households, schools and workplaces, and
commuting data. In our study, the source of these data were
routinely collected national statistics. The number of students per
school and workers per workplace vary in proportion to the
resident population in the different geographic areas. However, we
assumed that the employment rate was the same throughout Italy,
though it is known to vary greatly when comparing northern,
central, and southern Italy (4%, 6% and 12%, respectively) [34].
Moreover, in modelling the social distancing measures, we only
considered the closing of those public workplaces not providing
essential services, which could have resulted in an underestimate of
the effect of such measures. Furthermore, these workplaces are
probably not uniformly distributed throughout Italy.
In the global SEIR model we considered all infected persons to
be symptomatic and not travelling; thus we may have overesti-
mated the effect of travel restrictions. By contrast, national data on
in-coming flow by land and sea were not easily available, and we
therefore did not take into account land and sea importation and
control. This could also have overestimated the effect of travel
restrictions, since importation via all routes should be considered
Table 5. Clinical Attack rates and peak day, by combination of control measures.
Control measure
Cumulative AR
[%] (95% CI)
Peak day
(95% CI)
Peak daily AR
[%] (95% CI)
Millions of
AVP courses
used
Millions of
vaccine
courses used
90% air travel restriction
AVPu; fist vaccine dose at 2 months 4.5 (4.4–4.5) 213 (209–215) 0.04 (0.04–0.04) 6.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 4.6 (4.6–4.7) 186 (177–197) 0.04 (0.04–0.04) 7.1 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 6.7 (6.2–7.2) 154 (150–156) 0.15 (0.12–0.18) 10.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months* 5.7 (5.6–5.7) 214 (206–219) 0.05 (0.05–0.06) 8.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months* 5.8 (5.7–5.9) 194 (189–197) 0.06 (0.06–0.06) 8.9 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months* 7.4 (7.2–7.8) 155 (151–156) 0.14 (0.12–0.16) 11.3 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months{ 7.1 (7.0–7.1) 211 (207–217) 0.07 (0.07–0.07) 10.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months{ 7.2 (7.1–7.3) 187 (179–194) 0.08 (0.08–0.08) 11.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months{ 8.6 (8.2–9.0) 155 (151–156) 0.15 (0.12–0.18) 13.1 14.4
AVP for 8 weeks; first vaccine dose at 3 months 18.2 (18.1–18.3) 171 (167–176) 0.38 (0.34–0.4) 0.1 14.4
AVPu plus school/workplace close contacts; first vaccine dose at 3 months 2.1 (2.0–2.2) 141 (127–166) 0.02 (0.02–0.03) 10.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months, not vaccinating the elderly 5.3 (5.2–5.4) 192 (188–194) 0.05 (0.05–0.05) 8.0 8.5
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months, vaccinating also adults 2.3 (2.2–2.3) 186 (184–188) 0.02 (0.02–0.02) 3.6 24.6
AVPu, first vaccine dose at 3 months, time-limited border restrictions** 5.1 (5.0–5.1) 165 (161–170) 0.05 (0.05–0.06) 7.8 14.4
99% air travel restriction
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months 4.4 (4.4–4.5) 274 (253–280) 0.04 (0.04–0.04) 6.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 4.4 (4.3–4.5) 251 (246–257) 0.04 (0.04–0.04) 6.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 4.6 (4.5–4.6) 222 (210–230) 0.04 (0.04–0.04) 7.0 14.4
No air travel restriction
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months 4.6 (4.6–4.8) 163 (162–165) 0.04 (0.04–0.04) 7.2 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 6.2 (6.1–6.3) 126 (123,129) 0.12 (0.12–0.13) 9.5 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 11.0 (10.8–11.1) 152 (151–156) 0.28 (0.27–0.28) 10.2 14.4
Moderate scenario (R0=1.7). VE=70%; vaccination target categories: personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, indidividuals 2–18 years of age, unless
otherwise specified.
AVP=antiviral prophylaxis;
*Different vaccine effectiveness for different categories: 59% in individuals 2–18 years of age [16], 70% in individuals 40–64 years of age [15], and 40% in $65 year-olds
[17];
uUnlimited, household contacts;
{Vaccine effectiveness=50%;
**air travel restrictions for 2 months after the first national case
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.t005
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we did not consider in our analysis, could modify the effects of the
delay caused by air-travel restrictions, in particular, seasonality
[32], environmental effects, and viral evolution, whereas we
assumed that contact, transmission and disease parameters
remained constant throughout the pandemic period in Italy. Also,
we did not include disease-related mortality, considering that
deaths would probably occur at the latter stages of the infectious
period and thus would not affect the diffusion of disease.
Despite these limitations, and considering that we cannot
predict all aspects of an actual pandemic, this IBM, which is based
on country-specific demographic data, could be suitable for the
real-time evaluation of measures to be undertaken in the event of
the emergence of a new pandemic influenza virus.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Supporting information contains details on the model:
socio-demographic and commuting structure, and transmission
model.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s001 (0.15 MB
PDF)
Table S1 Percentage of different household types. * with
additional household member.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s002 (0.01 MB
PDF)
Table S2 Household size by type (in percentage). *with
additional household member.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s003 (0.01 MB
PDF)
Table S3 Age class of household heads in couples with children
by household size (in percentage).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s004 (0.01 MB
PDF)
Table S4 Age class of household head in couples without
children.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s005 (0.01 MB
PDF)
Table 6. Clinical attack rates and peak day, by combination of control measures.
Control measure
Cumulative AR
[%] (95% CI)
Peak day
(95% CI)
Peak daily AR
[%] (95% CI)
Millions of
AVP
courses
used
Millions
of vaccine
courses
used
90% air travel restriction
AVPu; fist vaccine dose at 2 months 14.4 (14.4–14.5) 132 (130–134) 0.28 (0.28–0.29) 21.3 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 20.5 (20.1–20.8) 124 (122–125) 0.79 (0.77–0.80) 29.1 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 24.6 (24.5–24.7) 124 (122–125) 0.79 (0.77–0.80) 34.9 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months* 16.2 (16.1–16.3) 130 (129–131) 0.34 (0.33–0.34) 23.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months* 21.1 (21.0–21.3) 124 (123–127) 0.78 (0.77–0.80) 30.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months* 24.7 (24.6–24.7) 124 (122–126) 0.78 (0.77–0.80) 35.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months{ 17.6 (17.4–17.7) 130 (127–132) 0.40 (0.39–0.40) 25.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months{ 21.6 (21.3–22.0) 124 (122–125) 0.79 (0.77–0.80) 30.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months{ 24.7 (24.6–24.8) 124 (122–125) 0.79 (0.77–0.80) 35.0 14.4
AVP for 8 weeks; first vaccine dose at 2 months 27.4 (27.3–27.4) 126 (123–130) 0.98 (0.97–0.99) 1.5 14.4
AVPu plus school/workplace close contacts; first vaccine dose at 2 months 7.9 (7.7–8.1) 117 (101–127) 0.14 (0.13–0.15) 31.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months, not vaccinating the elderly 16.0 (16.0–16.1) 131 (129–134) 0.32 (0.31–0.33) 23.2 8.5
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months, vaccinating also adults 9.0 (8.8–9.3) 126 (119–132) 0.16 (0.15–0.17) 13.6 24.6
AVPu, first vaccine dose at 2 months, time–limited air travel restrictions** 14.7 (14.6,14.8) 125 (121–128) 0.29 (0.28–0.3) 21.8 14.4
99% air travel restriction
AVPu; fist vaccine dose at 2 months 14.2 (14.1–14.3) 156 (152–158) 0.27 (0.26–0.28) 21.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 15.8 (15.5–16.3) 129 (127,131) 0.39 (0.35–0.47) 22.9 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 23.3 (23.0–23.6) 139 (137–141) 0.77 (0.75–0.79) 33.0 14.4
No air travel restriction
AVPu; fist vaccine dose at 2 months 16.5 (16.1–16.7) 99 (97–101) 0.49 (0.43–0.52) 24.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 23.7 (23.4–23.8) 109 (107–111) 0.75 (0.75–0.76) 33.6 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 24.8 (24.7–24.9) 109 (107–111) 0.75 (0.75–0.76) 35.3 14.4
Severe scenario (R0=2). VE=70%; vaccination target categories: personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, individuals 2–18 years of age, unless otherwise
specified.
AVP=antiviral prophylaxis;
*Different vaccine effectiveness for different categories: 59% in individuals 2–18 years of age [16], 70% in individuals 40–64 years of age [15], and 40% in $65 year-olds
[17];
uUnlimited, household contacts;
{Vaccine effectiveness=50%;
**air travel restrictions for 2 months after the first national case
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.t006
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Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s006 (0.01 MB
PDF)
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Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s007 (0.30 MB TIF)
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Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s008 (1.56 MB TIF)
Figure S3
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001790.s009 (1.05 MB TIF)
Figure S4
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